Anthrax suspect dies in apparent suicide

[Francois Cellier]

From the Mercury news

Anthrax suspect dies in apparent suicide

By David Willman
Los Angeles Times
Article Launched: 08/01/2008 01:31:11 AM PDT


A top government scientist who helped the FBI analyze samples from the 2001 anthrax attacks has died in Maryland from an apparent suicide, just as the Justice Department was about to file criminal charges against him for the attacks, the Los Angeles Times has learned.

Bruce Ivins, 62, who for the past 18 years worked at the government's elite biodefense research laboratories at Fort Detrick, Md., had been informed of his impending prosecution, said people familiar with Ivins, his death and with the FBI investigation.

Ivins, whose name had not been disclosed publicly as a suspect in the case, had played a central role in research to improve anthrax vaccines by preparing anthrax formulations used in experiments on animals.

Regarded as a skilled microbiologist, Ivins also had helped the FBI analyze the powdery material recovered from one of the anthrax-tainted envelopes sent to a U.S. senator's office in Washington, D.C.

Ivins died Tuesday at Frederick Memorial Hospital after having ingested a massive dose of prescription Tylenol mixed with codeine, said a friend and colleague who declined to be identified out of concern, he said, that he would be harassed by the FBI.

The death - without any mention of suicide - was announced to Ivins' colleagues at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in an e-mail.

"People here are pretty shook up about it," said Caree Vander Linden, a spokeswoman for USAMRIID, who said she was not at liberty to discuss details surrounding the death. The anthrax mailings killed five people, crippled national mail service, shut down a Senate office building and spread fear of terrorism in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

The extraordinary turn of events came after the government's payment in June of a settlement valued at $5.82 million to a former government scientist, Steven Hatfill, who was long targeted as the FBI's chief suspect despite a lack of any evidence that he had ever possessed anthrax.

Soon after the government's settlement with Hatfill was announced June 27, Ivins began showing signs of serious strain. One of his longtime colleagues told the Times that Ivins, who was being treated for depression, indicated to a therapist that he was considering suicide. Soon thereafter, family members and local police officers escorted Ivins away from USAMRIID, where his access to sensitive areas was curtailed, the colleague said.

Ivins was committed to a facility in Frederick for treatment of his depression. July 24, he was released from the facility.

The scientist faced forced retirement, planned for September, said his longtime colleague, who described Ivins as emotionally fractured by the federal scrutiny.

A spokeswoman for the FBI, Debra Weierman, said Thursday that the bureau would not comment regarding the death of Ivins. Last week, however, FBI Director Mueller told CNN that, "in some sense, there have been breakthroughs" in the case.

[Francois Cellier]

The story smells as fishy now as it did from day one.

[donquixote99]

Given the public and obvious mental distress the man was in, I think it's safe to assume the suicide was actual, not apparent.

I hope the nature of the evidence against him can be made public. It would be good to know more about that anthrax business. It greatly added to the climate of fear here after 9/11.

[Francois Cellier]

Unfortunately, the "climate of fear" was precisely what was needed to convince the U.S. public to go along with the attack on Iraq. The anthrax "terror" attack:

1. came just at the most convenient moment,
2. disappeared again as conveniently when no longer useful,
3. the crime seems now to have been committed by a government employee,
4. the FBI worked very hard for a long time to look at all the wrong places,...

That is precisely, what I consider fishy about this entire business.

[donquixote99]

I'm sure it would only do gpod for as many details as possible about this whole business to become public. But your list of suspicions is all circumstance and spin.

[potter]

Originally Posted by Francois Cellier

Unfortunately, the "climate of fear" was precisely what was needed to convince the U.S. public to go along with the attack on Iraq. The anthrax "terror" attack:

1. came just at the most convenient moment,
2. disappeared again as conveniently when no longer useful,
3. the crime seems now to have been committed by a government employee,
4. the FBI worked very hard for a long time to look at all the wrong places,...

That is precisely, what I consider fishy about this entire business.

Would evil men do evil things to reap billions? You betcha....

[P & CA News Bot]

A US scientist suspected of 2001 anthrax attacks has apparently killed himself as he faced charges, a newspaper says.

More...

[sarmajor]

Originally Posted by Francois Cellier

Unfortunately, the "climate of fear" was precisely what was needed to convince the U.S. public to go along with the attack on Iraq. The anthrax "terror" attack:

1. came just at the most convenient moment,
2. disappeared again as conveniently when no longer useful,
3. the crime seems now to have been committed by a government employee,
4. the FBI worked very hard for a long time to look at all the wrong places,...

That is precisely, what I consider fishy about this entire business.

Surely you are not implying that the US government would do such a thing to get the public on side in support of their proposed attack on a foreign nation.

Next you will be suggesting that the US government kept quiet about their knowledge of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor to get them onside for war with Japan

or that US ships were not attacked at the Gulf of Tonkin to get them onside to escalate the war in Vietnam

or that Saddam Hussain did not have WMD to get them onside for an invasion of Iraq

Or that North Korea was not as been settled

Or that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons to get them onside for an attack on ...........Work in progress - we will let that go for a moment

Or that the Cubans did not blow up the Maine to get them on side for an invasion of Cuba

I am not sure about the Zimmerman telegram that lead to US involvement in WWl

I wonder if it is just that most Americans are stupid or is it because the various US governments had decided that if you were on to a good thing - stick to it.

[Neko]

Originally Posted by sarmajor

I wonder if it is just that most people are stupid or is it because the various US governments had decided that if you were on to a good thing - stick to it.

I think that's fairer.

[donquixote99]

Misuse of history. Card-stacking.

Next you will be suggesting that the US government kept quiet about their knowledge of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor to get them onside for war with Japan

Complete crap.

or that US ships were not attacked at the Gulf of Tonkin to get them onside to escalate the war in Vietnam

That one you get.

or that Saddam Hussain did not have WMD to get them onside for an invasion of Iraq

You get that one too.

Or that North Korea was not as been settled

Can't make out what you're talking about at all.

Or that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons to get them onside for an attack on ...........Work in progress - we will let that go for a moment

Good idea.

Or that the Cubans did not blow up the Maine to get them on side for an invasion of Cuba

Probably a boiler explosion, but we didn't know that at the time...

I am not sure about the Zimmerman telegram that lead to US involvement in WWl

Unless you're for the Kaiser, why bring this up? It's not like we started that war....

I wonder if it is just that most Americans are stupid or is it because the various US governments had decided that if you were on to a good thing - stick to it.

Both. People don't vary from time to time--or from country to country. They react to the same sorts of stimuli in the same sorts of ways, and it's always the business of governments to understand that.

But the case for the anthrax business being a manufactured war excuse is still based totally on circumstance and supposition. If EVERY CARD stacked above represented a sneaky manipulation of opinion (which they don't) it would prove NOTHING about this particular event. And even the circumstance and supposition really aren't awfully strong in this case. The anthrax attacks were never blamed on any particular enemy, and they stopped way before the war drums vs. Saddam started beating.

[sarmajor]

Quote:
Next you will be suggesting that the US government kept quiet about their knowledge of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor to get them onside for war with Japan
Complete crap.

Don ......... saying that it is crap does not make it so.

Most historians (faced with overwhelming evidence) have come to the conclusion that the administration (through reading intercepted diplomatic and military coded messages) knew that an attack - specifically on Pearl harbour - was imminent.

They did this to get an isolationist America on side.

Even official government documents now support this contention.

I have previously posted a copy but cannot now recall the specific post.

This is not a conspiracy theory but an accepted fact

The US intelligence services also read the coded instructions from the Japanese government to its diplomats in Washington ordering them to burn all their documents and to deliver a declaration of war to the US Government - which was decoded long before the attack on Pearl Harbour and delivered by the Japanese diplomats to the US government about an hour after the start of the attack. The intention was to deliver it just before the attack but the Japanese diplomats could not decode it in time.

I have also read a number of books written by British, US navy and US army codebreakers - and they all showed copies of various original intercepted and decoded messages.

[sarmajor]

Sarmajor: I am not sure about the Zimmerman telegram that lead to US involvement in WWl

Don: Unless you're for the Kaiser, why bring this up? It's not like we started that war....

Neither did you start WWll however the Zimmerman telegram and the attack on Pearl Harbour were both primarily responsible for America entering the respective conflict

[donquixote99]

Originally Posted by sarmajor

Don ......... saying that it is crap does not make it so.

Most historians (faced with overwhelming evidence) have come to the conclusion that the administration (through reading intercepted diplomatic and military coded messages) knew that an attack - specifically on Pearl harbour - was imminent.

They did this to get an isolationist America on side.

Even official government documents now support this contention.

I have previously posted a copy but cannot now recall the specific post.

This is not a conspiracy theory but an accepted fact

The US intelligence services also read the coded instructions from the Japanese government to its diplomats in Washington ordering them to burn all their documents and to deliver a declaration of war to the US Government - which was decoded long before the attack on Pearl Harbour and delivered by the Japanese diplomats to the US government about an hour after the start of the attack. The intention was to deliver it just before the attack but the Japanese diplomats could not decode it in time.

I have also read a number of books written by British, US navy and US army codebreakers - and they all showed copies of various original intercepted and decoded messages.

My saying so does not make anything crap, of course. It's being so is independent of my saying so or not. But my assessment is accurate. You claim most historians support your conclusion. They do not, and even if over half did, truth is not determined by counting noses. You go on to call your position an 'accepted fact,' but this is a self-serving and unsupportable assertion; finding contrary assessments of history from respected sources is trivial. Here's a popular-level article at Salon that reflects such views, citing more scholarly sources: http://archive.salon.com/books/featu...fdr/index.html

What historians agree on is that FDR thought war with Japan inevitable, and desired that Japan fire the fist shot. There is NO persuasive evidence that specific intent to attack Pearl Harbor was known, let alone that anything was deliberately done to make US forces there or anywhere else more vulnerable to attack.

This is a matter of continued debate mainly because radical accusations sell books.

If you can be more specific about the evidence we are supposed to accept because you sort-of remember it, I am sure it can be rebutted.

[sarmajor]

If you can be more specific about the evidence we are supposed to accept because you sort-of remember it, I am sure it can be rebutted.

I do not 'sort-of remember it'

The fact that I cannot immediately identify in which one of 10,000+ posts I posted a copy of that official document that supports my conclusions is hardly surprising.

When I get a moment tomorrow I will find it a copy on the net and post it here.

Not that anything you see, read or hear is likely to change your preconceived ideas.

Apart from anything else, the fact that US forces were caught flatfooted at Pearl Harbour and in the Phillipines when it was obvious that the Pacific was on the verge of war - with even the newspapers reporting that a Japanese invasion fleet was heading towards Malaya - and the Japanese carrier fleet had disappeared off the ether either shows gross incompetence at the highest level - or something more sinister.

Were the US intelligence services that incompetent that they did not know that a major part of the Japanese fleet was in the Western Pacific?

Were the Army and Naval forces at Pearl Harbour and the bases in the Phillipines that incompetent that with even the newspapers anticipating war within a few days nobody thought it prudent even to take the most basic precautions.

Anyway I will soon produce the US government's report on the enquiry into the fiasco at Pearl Harbour and await your response.

The problem is that, although that official government enquiry found that the US administration knew about the proposed attack days beforehand, that report was never widely publicised after the war and, for obvious reasons (not least the 4,000 plus men killed there) was kept under wraps for well over 30 years.

Even then the media covered up for their politician mates.

[sarmajor]

How is this for starters


Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board [October 20, 1944].

From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 221-30.

Memo: To The Secretary of War:

The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the
possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons of security
should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War
is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure
concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.

1. General. Information from informers and other means as to the
activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the
negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of
the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941.
Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans
and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese
potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States.
Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the
enemy's intentions.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in
November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for
resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of
breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the
eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave
only a small fraction of this information. No direction was given the
Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"
message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent
safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in
Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the
Department on Alert Number 3.

This was not done.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon
actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be
disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent
upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific
directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the
admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete
responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The
disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that
its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The
difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from
the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert
them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly
aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the
right alert.

The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to
give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.

The details of this information follow:

2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions
from September to December 1941.

The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and
intentions during this period.

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had
been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese offensive
military operations.

2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese'
intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United
States. War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26
that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of
units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive
action.

3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent
sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United
States, but would maintain peace with Russia.

As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning
officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the
Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it
was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not
months."

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions
as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that
Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was
construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. All the information that the
War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the
policy making and planning agencies of the government. These officials
included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief
of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our
intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office
of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought.

Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans
Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while
they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question
him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies:

"I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General
Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the
Chief of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them."

4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying
their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war,
Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow
and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending
out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he
could not go over General Gerow's decision. Colonel Bratton then went to
see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in
ONI, and he concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should
be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost
immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements
with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2,
Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort,
Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from
Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to
be sent directly in a war warning message.

All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority
in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go
out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements
in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the
higher-ups in Washington secured this information. G-2 was prevented as
a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information of this sort
to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to any of this
type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its authority.

The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G-2.
Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When G-
2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians ahead
of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the estimate
and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight two
costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska.

Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval
Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into
the Navy during November and December.

Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last
date they could permit him negotiations. On November 26th specific
information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage
offensive war against the United States. Nomura on the 26th said he
thought he had failed the Emperor and that his humiliation was complete,
evidently referring to the ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary
of State.

Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to
Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:

"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding
the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the
number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of
hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to
such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a
declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday,
November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud," and on Monday,
December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began
coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to
reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their
directive.

The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their codes on
December 3.

3. The "Winds" Message.

Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a message was intercepted
by the Federal Communications Commission, to the effect that the
Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with the United
States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions, which
would indicate whether the war would be with the United States, Russia,
or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The Federal Communications
Commission was asked to listen for such information.

On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval
Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the
message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the
one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either
the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised
General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise
wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a
conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler
protested that that would be too late. He reported back to General
Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans
Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said,
"No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the
Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same
suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had
been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. It was about the 5th
or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at
Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on December 5 that
Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith,
because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very
quickly."

Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese
weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These
arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Bratton
testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations
shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster,
December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received
any such information.

He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to
him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was
looking for. Later he learned from the Navy about their monitoring
efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they would
probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in Washington.
That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to Fielder, G-
2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commander Rochefort, to secure orally
information of this sort. A copy of this message has been produced in
the record showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler
testified to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. But
Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. The Navy now admits having
received this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War
Department files show no copy of such message.

From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of the
"winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of November
1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with Russia,
England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds" message. On
November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December 3, 1941, the
Naval Attache at Batavia gave another version of the "winds" code. All
three of these messages indicated the probability of the breaking off of
relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the United States or
the other nations mentioned.

On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy
Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the
Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace
with Russia."

This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot
be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected
with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies
were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared.

Captain Safford testified [before the Army Board]:

"General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search
which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original
message?

"Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the
message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the
officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little
harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it.
And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for
required written statements [from] anybody who might have any notice of
that; and though the written statements disclosed a lot of destruction
of other messages and things not messages, but the intercepts; not the
translations nothing ever came to light on that message, either the
carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been
filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the
translation should have been filed under the JD number, which I think is
7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls
very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but
things sometimes got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on
was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the
translation. We had a double file.

"The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about
the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all
important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts
Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for
completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and
that "Winds" translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I
do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it
may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never
came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is
the last I have seen of it.

"We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could
run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact
date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down
and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory
of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do distinctly recall it."

* * * * * * * * *

"General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes sir.

"General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a place
where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place
you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have
just discussed.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

"General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the JD file?

"Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.

"General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order.

"General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it
went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony,
of 7001?

"Captain SAFFORD. It probably was.

"General RUSSELL. You don't know that?

"Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.

"General RUSSELL. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?

"Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.

"General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there?

"Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is
present or accounted for except 7001.

"General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place
in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of
those files?

"Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we
couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we
haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked
all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is
missing or unaccounted for."

The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message, have been
destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that this
message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent to
the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated to
the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.

It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received
by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as
December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized.

4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message; the Short
Implementing Message.

The first 13 parts of the long reply of the Japanese finally terminating
the relationships with the United States began to come in in translated
form from the Navy on the afternoons of December 6, and the 13 parts
were completed between 7:00 and 9:00 the evening of December 6. Colonel
Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of
War Department G-2; was the designated representative for receiving and
distributing to the Army and to the Secretary of State copies of
messages of this character received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to
deliver to the President and to its own organization copies of similar
messages.

Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and
10:30 p.m., December 6, as follows:

To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in
a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. He told General
Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers
and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the
bag and see the contents.

To General Miles by handing the message to him, by discussing the
message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence.
He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows.
This record shows no action by General Miles.

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's
executive in the War Plans Division.

He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State
Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30
p.m.

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had
urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with
General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General
Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part
of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of
Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning.

In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford shows, the
following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of
the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.

Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the
afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to
the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. This
portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer
consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson,
and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then
delivered a copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the President was
engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall.
When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house h